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PUBLIC PROCEDURES FOR THE PROMULGATION
OF INTERPRETATIVE RULES
AND GENERAL STATEMENTS OF POLICY
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

Federal, state, and local administrative agencies produce increasing
numbers of policies that spread into every recess of modern life. So
much so that what Justice Jackson called the "fourth branch"~ creates
much of the "law" that controls many of the intimate details of our
lives. 2 This law finds expression more often through administrative
rulemaking than through agency adjudication.3 This increasing emphasis on rulemaking has intensified the study of rules. Of the various types
*Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. B.A. 1966, University of
Maryland; J.D. 1969, George Washington University; LL.M. 1975, University of Chicago.
1. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F .2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(courts increasingly asked to review agency action affecting fundamental personal interests in life, health, liberty).
3. Recently courts and commentators have expressed some doubt as to the validity or
utility of the distinction between rules and orders, or between rulemaking and adjudication. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 500-Ql (4th Cir. 1973)
(court sho11ld look to issue of proceedings rather than classification to determine procedures necessary); Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dictum), cert,
denied, 405 U.S.1074 (1972) (in many cases there is a fine line between adjudicatory and
rulemaking proceedings); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.01, at 286
(1958) (particular activity, not label, should determine procedural needs). The Supreme
Court's opinion in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, however, demonstrates
the continued validity of the distinction. 410 U.S. 224 (1973). The Court noted, in distinguishing between the promulgation of rules and the adjudication of disputed facts, that
the two salient characteristics of rules are their general applicability and legislative
nature. Id. at 224-46; see Roffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Kleindienst, 478 F.2d 1, 13 (3d Cir.
1973) (agency finding had characteristics of rules; proceeding was rulemaking). Courts
have utilized general application as a characteristic of a rule even though the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines rules as covering actions of "particular applicability."
Administrative Procedure Act§ 2 (c), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970). A rule mav have general
effect, but apply directly only to one or a few specific individual interests. See, e.g.,
Associated Electric Coop., Inc. v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1167, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975) (FPC rulemaking power includes setting rates for one
customer); PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 732 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974) (SEC has discretion to utilize rules or orders in dealing with
specific individuals or situations); Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1303,
1306 (lOth Cir. 1973) (proposed EPA regulation, although a general rule, only affected one
company). Agency action has the second characteristic, legislative nature, if it contemplates policymaking for the future. However, retroactive rules may be valid if their
retro~pective applicability is reasonable. See, e.Jl., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,203
(1947) (retroactive effect must be balanced against harm produced contrary to statutory
design); Maceren v. District Dir., Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 509 F.2d 934, 93941 (9th Cir. 1974) (retroactive application of rule invalidated due to undue hardship and
lack of sufficient statutory interest); General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 86364 (5th Cir. 1971) (rule with retroactive effects not unreasonable or invalid). Thu!f,
generalized application and prospective policy formulation serve as the best indications
that agency action is a rule.
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of substantive rules,4 legislative rules have been the most closely
studied. By experimentation and analysis, we are beginning to
understand legislative rulemaking, but our understanding of the
substantive rules that do not fit easily into that category, such as
interpretative rules and general statements of policy, remains primi·
tive.5 Because even a brief survey of agency policy announcements
suggests that nonlegislative rules predominate, the need to explore some
of the characteristics and problems unique to these "lesser rules" is
obvious.
Distinctions among legislative rules, interpretative rules, and general
statements of policy have long been recognized. 6 Legislative rules are
those policy pronouncements that are made pursuant. to legislative
authority,' that normally must be made through the procedures
prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),8 and that are
subject to limited judicial review.9 An agency with such authority
4. The term "substantive rules" is used in this article to distinguish these rules from
procedural rules. The term is often used to refer to legislative rules. See UNITED STATES
DEP"TOF JUSTICE, A '!TORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AfYr
30 n.3 (1947) (hereinafter cited as ATT'Y GEN.'S MANUAL); Note, Administrative
Law-FTC Denied Substantive Rulemaking Power, 21 KAN. L. REV. 198, 199·200 (1973).
Nonlegislative rules, however, may also be substantive; thus, the term "legislative rules"
in this article means rules promulgated under legislative authority and in compliance with
the notice and comment requirements of the APA. See Administrative Procedure Act §§
4{a) (1)-{3), (b), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 (b) (1)-(3), {c) (1970); notes 7-9 infra and accompanying
text.
5. Rules may appear under various labels: guides, rulings, guidelines, interpretations,
office memoranda, opinions, adjudicatory opinions, general counsel memoranda, and
others. The APA uses the terms "interpretative rules" and "general statements of policy"
in reference to substantive rules that need not be made after notice and comment
procedures. Administrative Procedure Act§ 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(A) (1970).
6. See Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See generally Lee,
Legislative and Interpretative Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1·4 (1940 ).
7. SeeK. DAVIS, supra note 3, § 5.03, at 299. While the term "legislative rules" is not
always used, the concept oflegislative rules, rules made pursuant to delegated power, has
become firmly established. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235·36 (1974) (legisla·
tive rules promulgated under legislative power through requisite proced.ures); Mourning
v. Family Publication Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (Federal Reserve Board has
rulemaking power to promote purposes of enabling legislation); National Nutritional
Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 142, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (legislative
rulemaking power necessary to interpret statutes). Compliance with legislative rules can
be enforced with legal sanctions. See Lee, supra note 6, at 3.
8. Administrative Procedure Act§§ 4(a)·{d), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)·{e) (1970) (notice and
comment procedures). If the "rules are required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing," then sections 556 and 557 prescribe the appropriate
trial-type procedures. See id. §§ 7, 8, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557; cf. United States v. Florida East
Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 238-46 (1973) (most legislative rulemaking requires section 553
procedures; adjudication of disputed facts requires procedures of sections 556 and 557).
9. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 485, 488 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (Secretary's decision nonarbitrary; judicial review presents the risk of arbitrary
supervision and revision of efforts to implement that statute's purposes); Charnita, Inc. v.
FTC, 479 F.2d 684, 687 (3d Cir. 1973) (regulation consistent with legislative purpose will
not be overturned); Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F .2d 601, 619 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 922 (1964) (review of rules of general application present11 only legal
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initially designates a rule to be legislative by promulgating it pursuant
to delegated authority or by acting so that it can be inferred that the
rule is so promulgated.10 Interpretative rules are conceptually distinct
from legislative rules.U Contrary to some opinions,12 interpretative
rules do not necessarily interpret either a statute or another rule, 13
question-whether factual premise is arbitrary or capricious). This limitation on judicial
review should not be carried too far because agencies are not directly subject to control by
the electorate. See Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 738-45 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1074 (1972) (factual basis of rule subject to review, but court may not substitute its
judgment for the agency's); REPORT OF TilE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S.
Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 101·02 (1941) (administrative agency not a representative body; members not subject to direct political control like legislators)
[hereinafter cited as S. Doc. No. 8]. Legislative rules should be considered as "quasilegislative," not as legislation per se. See Chicago v. FPC, supra at 742 (rulemaking is not
totally equivalent to legislative action). But cf. Pacific State Box & Basket Co. v. White,
296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935) (rebuttable presumption that facts exist to justify exercise of
police power attaches to state regulation with legally delegated authority just as well as to
statute).
10. See Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 930 (1965 ).
11. A distinguished judge, knowledgeable in the field of administrative law, has written
that "[t]his Court accepts with alacrity the authoritative view that it is not profitable to
explore the asserted distinction [between legislative rules and interpretative rules] which
is 'fuzzy at best.' "National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 142, 146
n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Frankel, J.); see Shapiro, supra note 10, at 930. One can quarrel with
Judge Frankel's statement on several points. The distinction is not "fuzzy" but clear: a
legislative rule must be promulgated pursuant to a legislative grant of authority. The distinction is troublesome not because it is unclear, but because it is not always easy to determine whether there was congressional intent to confer legislative rulemaking authority
and if that authority is clear, whether the agency intended to promulgate the rule pursuant
to that authority. Secondly, the distinction is indeed "profitable" since both the scope of
review and the required procedure depend on the distinction. Lastly, Judge Frankel might
have difficulty demonstrating that he has recited the "authoritative view." See notes 6-7
supra.
Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc. illustrates the distinction between legislative and
interpretative rules. 499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit relied on four sources in
applying the Truth in Lending Act: the Act, Regulation Z, the agency's interpretative
rules under Regulation Z, and staff opinion letters. Id. at 976. Unfortunately, the court
lumped all the agency pronouncements, including Regulation Z, together and found t:.tat
they were not binding on the court, but were only entitled to "great weight.'' I d. Clearly,
Regulation Z is a legislative rule, which can be distinguished from either the interpretative
rules or the opinion letters, and is binding unless arbitrary or capricious. See note 9 supra.
Contrary to the opinion, the court was free to substitute its judgment for the
interpretative rules and the staff opinion letters but not for Regulation Z. See notes 15-16
infra and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., American Bancorporation, Inc. v. Federal Reserve System, 509 F.2d 29,34
(8th Cir. 1974) (amended regulation expressing agency's view of original regulation an
interpretative rule); Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (interpretative rules are the agency's construction of a statutory provision); Reeves
v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455,458 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975)
(same); ATT'Y GEN.'S MANUAL, supra note 4, at 30 n.3 (interpretative rules are "rules or
statements issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the
statutes and rules that it administers").
13. SeeK. DAVIS, supra note 3, § 5.03, at 304 (interpretative rules may also interpret
another interpretative rule, judicial decisions, administrative decisions, administrative
rulings, any other law or interpretation, any combination of these, or nothing at all).
It is sometimes difficult to determine whether an announcement changing a legislative
rule is an amendment of the rule or merely an interpretative rule based on the legislative
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except to the extent they may be said to interpret the nebula of law
and policy handed down by Congress through the agency's enabling act.
The authority to develop interpretative rules rarely emanates from a
specific legislative grant; the power is most often derived from the
establishment of an administrative agency and the nature of its
expertise.14 Because interpretative rulemaking is usually an assumed
power, it is appropriate that interpretative rules do not bind, but may
persuade, a court in its exercise of judicial review. 15 Thus, interpretative
rule. See Detroit Edison Co. v. EPA, 496 F.2d 244, 246-49 (6th Cir. 1974) (substance of
charge was rulemaking and subject to section 553 procedures); United States v. Finley
Coal Co., 493 F.2d 285, 289-91 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1089 (1974) (substantive
revision of mandatory standards requires rulemaking procedures).
14. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 696 (2d Cir.
1975) (specific.delegation of power to promulgate rules not always necessary; general
delegation sufficient in certain areas of expertise). Because Congress cannot foresee every
problem that will confront an agency, necessary and proper power must be recognized, and
the cases are legion that uphold the exercise of powers not specifically delegated to the
agency but necessary to implementation of the legislative mandate. See, e.g., United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168·78 (1968) (Court looked to enabling
act's terms, purposes, and legislative history to find broad authority for FCC to issue rules
and regulations); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968) (scope of
agency's authority determined by purposes for delegation of authority); American
Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967) (agencies have power
to promulgate new regulations to meet changing needs and patterns of regulated conduct).
The exercise of the power to make interpretative rules is on even firmer ground; not only is
such power necessary, but it is a characteristic power of administrative agencies. The mere
creation of an administrative agency can be said to carry with it certain inllerent powers,
one of which is the power to make interpretative rules. See Davis, Administrative
Rules-Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 930 (1948). The
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act is one instance where Congress separately
granted the two rulemaking powers. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act §
202(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(a)(1) (Supp. 1976). In the Privacy Act of 1974 Congress
intentionally denied the Privacy Protection Commission legislative rulemaking and
expressly charged the Commission with defining policy through interpretative rules. Pub.
L. No. 93·579, § 5(e), 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. IV, 1974); seeS. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 39 (1974).
15. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.134, 140 (1944) (courts should weigh evidence,
including interpretative rules, and decide each case on its facts); National Nutritional
Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 696 (2d Cir. 1975) (FDA's interpretative rules
are advisory and subject to challenge and review).
After over thirty years, no court has been able to improve on Justice Jackson's
authoritative statement in Skidmore that while interpretative rules are not controlling
upon courts, they "do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." 323 U.S. at 140. The weight given
to the agency's judgment will depend upon the thoroughness of consideration, the validity
of reasoning, consistency with prior and subsequent pronouncements, and other factors
which make the agency's opinion persuasive, even if not controlling. I d. Extra weight may
be given to an interpretative rule because of such factors as agency specialization,
statutory reenactment, contemporaneous construction of a statute by the agency charged
with its enforcement, and longstanding effectiveness. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,
416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (great weight given longstanding interpretation where Congress
reenacted statute without relevant change); NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74·75
(1973) (great weight afforded longstanding, contemporaneously construed agency inter·
pretation); Davis, supra note 14, at 934-43 (contemporaneous construction, longstanding
interpretation, reenactment are factors in courts' determinations of authority to give
interpretative rules).But cf. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 864·65 (D.C. Cir.)
(en bane), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973) (interpretations contrary to legislative intent
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rules may be subject to de novo review, and courts are usually free to
substitute their judgment for that of the agency.16 General statements
of policy are not easily distinguished from interpretative rules, but the
terms themselves may provide a distinction: rules are fairly concrete
standards of conduct; statements are mere expressions of policy.17 A
general statement of policy may be a vehicle for disclosure of less
formal, tentative policy that exists in the agency and that has reached a
threshold level of concreteness sufficient to make disclosure of some
value. Although attempts have been made to distinguish the two/ 8
may be overturned no matter how longstanding). These factors will affect the court's
decision and push the court in the direction of giving more weight to an interpretative rule
except where the court feels confident in its own expertise over the subject matter.
By far the most consistent judicial approach is to give deference to the pronouncement
embodied in an interpretative rule. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94·95
(1973) (interpretative rule entitled to great deference unless inconsistent with congression·
a1 intent); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34 (1971) (where enabling act and
legislative history support interpretative rule, guidelines treated as expressing the will of
Congress). Although a court may give a rule great weight, it is not properly "bound" by an
interpretative rule. Nevertheless, courts sometimes use language indicating that they felt
bound by an interpretative rule. See, e.g., Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co., 469 F.2d 453,
456 n.2 (9th Cir. 1972) (court bound where agency's interpretation not outside its
authority); CIBA-GEIGY Corp. v. Richardson, 446 F.2d466, 467-68 (2d Cir.1971) (agency
has power to issue binding interpretative regulations); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs,
Inc., 329 F. Supp. 936, 939 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (agency's interpretations consistent with act
and not plainly erroneous entitled to great weight or binding). An egregious example is
found in Morris u. Richardson, where the court accepted HEW's interpretation that the
phrase "public child-placement agency" in a statute governing benefits for adopted
children did not include a county court, even though there was no adoption agency in the
county, and state law required that adoptions be decreed in the county where the adoptive
parents reside. 455 F .2d 775, 777-78 (4th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S.
422 (1973).
16. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Aar,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.18 (1945) [hereinafter S. Doc.
No. 248] (interpretative rules are subject to plenary judicial review).
17. Administrative Procedure Act §4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Although section 553
expressly exempts "gener!ll statements of policy" from the notice provision, and thereby
the comment provision, and "statements of policy" from the timing requirements, it is un·
likely that the drafters intended to establish a distinction between the two terms. See id.
§§ 4(a), (c), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(A), {d) (2). A distinction would exempt general statements
of policy from the notice and comment provision but not individualized or specific statements of policy. Notice and comment is even less suitable for specific statements of policy
than it would be for general statements of policy. The drafters of the APA could not have
intended this result, and hence, it seems proper to consider the terms in sections 553(b )(A)
and 553(d)(2) as covering the same subject matter. On the other hand, section 552(a)(1)
(D) requires publication of "statements of general policy," while section 552(a)(2)(B)
requires that "statements of policy" be made available for public inspection and copying.
See id. §§ 3(a) (3), (c), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (a) (1) (D), (2) (B). In this provision a distinction
makes sense. Expressions of general policy should be made generally available through
publication, whereas expressions of policy of special interest need only be available to
those with interest enough to make an effort to elicit the information. The rationale of
having only material of general interest in the Federal Register is supported by the view,
urged for many years, that the Federal Register contains too much and not too little.
18. See Pacific Lighting Serv. Co. v. FPC, 518 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1975) (statement
of Commission policy not a "rule"); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38-39
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (general policy statement announces agency policy for the future, but does
not bind courts or finally determine rights or issues).
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there appears to be no analytical purpose served by such a distinction
because the concepts that relate to these and other nonlegislative rules
are the same. The rules are exempt from the notice and comment
procedures of the .APA, codified in section 553 of title 5 of the United
States Code. 19 They each have the same persuasive effect on judicial
review, 20 and they bind the agency where necessary to ensure fairness
It has been suggested that general statements of policy are rules directed primarily at
the staff of an agency and intended to guide the staff in conducting discretionary
functions, while other rules are directed primarily at the public in an effort to impose
obligations on them. See Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the
Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy under the A.P.A., 23 AD.
L. REv.l01, 115 (1971). The Attorney General's Manual distinguishes the two differently:
General Statements of Policy-statements issued by an agency to advise the public
prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a dis·
cretionary power, Interpretative Rules-rules or statements issued by an agency to
advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it
administers.
A'IT'Y GEN.'S MANUAL, supra note 4, at 30 n.3. I tis questionable whether either distinction
is very meaningful. Every expression of policy, whether made through adjudication,
legislative rulemaking, or otherwise, deals with and limits agency discretion. It is naive to
think that an interpretation of a statute or rule can divorce itself from the discretion of the
agency. A general statement of policy may disclose the agency's policy in exercising its
discretion, but so do interpretative rules, legislative rules, and precedent gleaned from ad·
judicative orders. A distinction based on the difference between interpretation and the dis·
closure of how such discretion will be exercised is neither meaningful nor helpful.
19. See Administrative Procedure Act§ 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(A) (1970). Subsection
553(e), conferring the right to petition, does not contain any exceptions; thus, all rules,
except those listed in subsections 553 (a) (1) and (2), are subject to petition for issuance,
repeal, or amendment by an interested person. Id. §§ 4(1)·(2), (d), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a) (1)·
(2),(e).
20. Some courts have attempted to distinguish the effects of the two suggesting that
interpretative rules are entitled to "great weight" while general statements of policy are
only entitled to "weight." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33,40 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(general statement of policy entitled to less deference than a rule or adjudicative order); cf.
Helton v. Mercury Freight Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 365, 368 n.4 (5th Cir. 1971) (guides and
handbooks have some weight, but not that of interpretative rules); Futrell v. Columbia
Club, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 566, 571 (S.D. Ind. 1971) (interpretative rules entitled to "con·
siderable weight;" opinion letters entitled to "weight"). This distinction is of little value;
the court should ignore labels and look instead to the factors bearing on the persuasive·
ness of the particular rule or policy. See note 15 supra.
Because the APA allows judicial review of final agency action only, the District of
Columbia Circuit, in Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Ass 'n v. SEC, was compelled to
deal with the scope of review of certain general statements of policy. 442 F.2d 132 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971); 'see Administrative Procedure Act§§ 10(a), (c), 5
U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1970). The court held that where general statements of policy are
intended to and do result in action on the part of regulated businesses, the statements will
be subject to judicial review. 442 F.2d at 142; see notes 47·53 infra and accompanying
text; cf. Pacific Gas &Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38·39 (9th Cir. 1975) (judicial review,
under the Natural Gas Act, of general statements of policy limited to instances in which
the statements have an immediate and significant impact and there is a record suitable for
review). The court will limit the scope of its review to the questions whether the general
statement of policy was ultra vires and whether some factual basis for the agency action
existed. Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Ass'n v. SEC, supra at 142, 145. The factual
basis is "presumed to exist unless negatived by the challenger." I d. at 145.
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to an adversely affected party.21
Broad procedural discretion is a major advantage for agencies that
make policy through interpretative rules and general statements of
policy, but the complete absence of procedures for the promulgation of
these rules has existed too long. The public deserves a role in the
making of many such rules, and the lack of any public role has
undoubtedly resulted in the reluctance of courts to give agencies total
discretion in choosing the type of rule to issue. 22 The exemption of
these two types of rules from the procedural requirements of the .APA
has been criticized, and legislative proposals to amend the .APA have
included the deletion of these exemptions.23 The legislative histocy of
the APA, however, evidences careful consideration of the exemptions
and leaves no doubt that the drafters felt that procedural flexibility for
21. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959) (having chosen a discretionary
course of action, agency bound by procedural and substantive regulations governing that
action); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 373-76 (1957) (same); United States ex rel. Accardi
v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-68 (1954) (same). Recently, the Supreme Court held
that a defendant may assert good faith reliance on interpretative rules as a defense in a
prosecution for violation of a statute. See United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem.
Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 673-75 (1973). But cf. Note, Judicial Review ofReversals of Policy by
Administrative Agencies, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1251, 1255-56 (1955) (courts more likely to
allow retroactive change in interpretative rules than in legislative rules because reliance
less justified). The best view is that the failure of an agency to follow its own interpretative
rules should be prima facie evidence of arbitrary or capricious administrative action. See
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1303 & n.23 (D.D.C. 1973 ), modified
on other grounds, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (change in interpretative rule may be
evidence that new interpretation arbitrary or inconsistent). General statements of policy
should be considered merely a means of disclosure; a court should cautiously bind an
agency in its attempts to develop and disclose rational policy. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (general statements of policy entitled to less
deference than rules or adjudicative orders; court should assess underlying wisdom of
policy). But cf. Note, supra at 1256-57 (because court has as much expertise as agency,
change in policy based on philosophy should be subject to greater judicial review than
change due to changed circumstances in the regulated industry).
22. Hamilton, The Need for Procedural Innovation in Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV.
1276, 1314 (1972); see, e.g., Pacific Gas &Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506F.2d 33,40 (D.C. Cir.1974)
(agency does not have benefit of public exploration when general statement of policy pro·
mulgated); American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 317 F.2d 887, 890
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (amendment of order not an interpretative rule, further procedures
necessary); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858,863-65 (D. Del.1970)
(regulations that have immediate and substantial impact not interpretative rules; notice
and comment procedures required).
23. See, e.g., S. 518, S. 2770, S. 2771, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S.1663, S. 2335, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The Hoover Task Force advocated the repeal of these procedural
exemptions. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF
THE GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 147-50, 157·60
(1955) (Recommendations 28 and 32) (notice through publication in the Federal Register
and public participation in the formulation of nonlegislative rules required except when
public interest demands secrecy). The Model State Administrative Procedure Act incorporated these recommendations. Uniform Law Commissioners, Revised Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT. 147 (Supp. 1967) (reliance on
the recommendations of the Hoover Report in revising the Model Act).
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such rules is essential to sound administrative process.24 Agencies faced
with the necessity of full section 553 compliance might simply choose
not to promulgate many interpretative rules and general statements of
policy. 25 The requirements of section 553 would bring benefits, but
they would also bring disadvantages.
The solution to this dilemma is the recognition that agencies should
promulgate many interpretative rules and general statements of policy
after abbreviated public procedures tailored to particular situations,
that full section 553 procedures are not always necessary, and that
procedural requirements cannot be applied equally to all types of rules.
One possibility for imposing abbreviated procedures on these rules is
the repeal of the categorical exemptions of interpretative rules and
general statements of policy from section 553 and the development of a
flexible approach to the "good cause" exemptions of section 553.26 A
better approach, however, would be the evolution of a broad range of
abbreviated public procedures through judicial review of agencies'
promulgation procedures to ensure that the choice of procedures
comports with basic notions of fairness and does not abuse the
agencies' discretion.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE "GoOD CAUSE" ExEMPTIONS IN
LIEU OF CATEGORICAL ExEMPTIONS

A means already exists for moderating and rationalizing the
elimination of the categorical exemptions: two provisions of section
553 allow agencies to dispense with public procedures when there is
good cause for doing so. Section 553(b)(B) exempts rules from the
notice and comment procedures if such procedures would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest," 27 and section
24. SeeS. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 18 (Senate Judiciary Committee Report) (non·
legislative rulemaking should be encouraged by giving agencies procedural discretion with
safeguards of plenary judicial review and petitions for reconsideration).
Retention of the procedural exemptions for interpretative rules and general statements
of policy has been supported by the Administrative Conference of the United States. See
Recommendation 72·5: Procedures for Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, 2
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 66 ( 1972).
25. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S.1160, S. 1336, S. 1758, and S.1879, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 179 (1965) (statement of Professor Kenneth Culp Davis) (elimination of exceptions
will lead to concealment of policies).
26. See AdministrativeProcedureAct§§4(a), (c), 5U.S.C.§§ 553 (b) (B), (d) (3) (1970).
27. Id. § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) (B). Although the exemptions in section 553(b) refer
only to the notice requirement, it is obvious that they are also incorporated into the public
participation and statement provisions of section 553(c). Id. §§ 4(a), (b), 5 U.S.C. §§
553(b), (c); see S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 200, 258 (Report of House and Senate
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553(d)(3) provides that a rule may become effective immediately upon
publication where good cause is found. 28 Section 553(b)(B) requires
the agency to incorporate the finding of good cause and the supporting
reasons in any rule issued without notice and comment, and the agency
must publish its finding of good cause with the rule intended to be
effective immediately.29 Although these sections do not contain the
same language, they most likely will be considered virtually identical. 30
Thus, the good cause exemption of section 553(d)(3) can be dealt with
as if it had the "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest" language of section 553(b )(B).
Although the terms "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest" necessarily overlap, the legislative history of the APA
indicates that they were intended to cover different problems. 31 Several
cases have dealt in a very cursory manner with each of these
justifications for claiming the "good cause" exemption from notice and
comment procedures. Courts limit the exemption for impracticability
to situations in which notice and participation would be unreasonable,
such as where emergency action is required to avoid injury or where full
notice and comment procedures would frustrate the rule's objectives.32
Notice and comment procedures may be found unnecessary where the
rulemaking involves minor matters or refinements in an existing rule, 33
but not where the rule may have substantial impact.34 Rules for which
Judiciary Committees) (public participation provisions apply only when notice is
required).
28. Administrative Procedure Act§ 4(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (3) (1970).
29. Id. §§ 4(a), (c), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 (b) (B), (d) (3); see Kelly v. Department of Interior,
339 F. Supp. 1095, 1100·02 (E.D. Cal1972) (good cause not shown for exempting section
553(b) (B) rule from publication).
30. See Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rule-Making Under the APA,
71 MICH. L. REV.221, 308..()9 (1972)(sections 553(b) (B) and (d) (3) should be treated alike).
31. See S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 200 (Report of Senate Judiciary Committee).
32. See Arizona Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456, 481 (9th Cir. 1971)
(hearing procedures regulations exempted from notice and comment requirements because
little time before hearings and participants need to know applicable rules of procedure);
United States v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 342 F. Supp. 272, 277 (D. Md. 1972)
(unexplained statement that notice and comment procedures impracticable for determining wage increase ceiling upheld); S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 200 (impracticable
means public procedures would prevent due and required execution of agency functions).
33. See United States v. United States Trucking Corp., 317 F. Supp. 69, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (procedures unnecessary where regulations reflected internal change in regulatory
agency); S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 200 (unnecessary means minor or technical
amendments in which the public has no interest).
34. See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1969) (change in interest
computation not minor; notice and comment procedures necessary); National Motor
Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 95-96 (D.D.C. 1967) (three judge
court), affd mem., 393 U.S. 18 (1968) (substantial impact of regulation required notice
and comment procedures).
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notice and comment are unnecessary are those in which the public bas
so little interest that an agency would not expect outside participation;
such rules involve simple mathematical computations and technical or
grammatical changes in an existing rule. In addition, notice and
comment procedures may be considered unnecessary where another
related proceeding afforded the opportunity for participation. 35 ·Full
notice and comment procedures may be contrary to the public interest
where procedures will defeat the purpose of the rule or seriously impair
its effectiveness.36
Repeal of the exemptions for interpretative rules and general
statements of policy would not necessarily impose notice and comment
procedures on all such rules. The nature and usefulness of such rules
depends to a certain extent on the absence of a public input
requirement, and hence the good cause justification for eliminating the
public role in the rule's formulation may be available. The value of the
good cause exemptions approach lies in the requirement that an agency
provide written justification for not using section 553 notice and
comment procedures;37 the categorical exemptions for interpretative
rules and general statements of policy require no such justification, and
their exercise hinges only on resolution of the definitional question.
Controversy over definitions diverts attention from the reasons for not
using public procedures and focuses instead on the theoretical
boundaries of the categories. Repeal of the categorical exemptions
would not necessarily lead to the imposition of an inflexible requirement of notice and comment procedures on all interpretative rulemaking and general policy statement formulation, but it would have the
beneficial effect of requiring written justification where an agency
desires to forego procedural requirements. 38
A preliminary study of interpretative rules and general statements of
policy presented two reasons against replacing the categorical exemptions with the good cause approach: uncertainty whether an action
35. See Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1, 8-10 (3d Cir. 1973) (dictum) (hearings
on state regulations normally sufficient for federal approval, but change in circumstances
in this case required new hearings); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 502..()3
(4th Cir. 1973) (hearings on state regulations sufficient).
36. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(delay in licensing nuclear power plant against public interest); cf. S. Doc. No. 248, supra
note 16, at 200 (Report of Senate Judiciary Committee) (contrary to the public interest
exemption supplements the terms impracticable or unnecessary).
37. See Administrative Procedure Act § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1970) (must
incorporate finding of good cause and brief statement of supporting reasons in rules
issued).
38. Unfortunately, courts are not always as firm as they should be in requiring written
justification. See Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975)
(although no written justification, court found good cause existed for exemption from
procedural requirements); California v. Simon, 504 F.2d 430, 439 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S.1021 (1975) (same).
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qualifies for a good cause exemption may lead an agency to use section
553 procedures unnecessarily, and the discretion granted the agency
under the good cause exemptions may increase litigation on procedural
issues.39 The first objection, that uncertainty will cause agencies to use
notice and comment procedures unnecessarily, is a danger, but will not
likely result in a serious problem. Where notice and comment
procedures are impracticable, the realities of the situation will compel
the agency to avoid the procedures. Where they are unnecessary, the
use of procedures will result in little additional delay or expense
because public participation will be insubstantial. Where notice and
comment would be contrary to the public ip.terest, conscientious
agency officials will avoid section 553 procedures. The second
argument, that use of the good cause exemptions will result in increased
litigation, is more substantial. Vague rights do lead to increased judicial
challenge, and the three good cause standards are vague. Nonetheless,
such procedural challenges will most often come before the courts as
part of a broader challenge to a rule. Thus, resort to the good cause
exemptions may increase the number of charges in each challenge but
not the overall number of challenges.
If the amount of litigation created by unclear legislative standards for
rulemaking becomes too great, the agency may, through procedural
rules, make categorical findings of good cause for exempting specific
groups of rules and carefully define the instances in which it will apply
those exemptions.40 The procedural rules might require limited
participation where good cause will support abbreviation, but not
39. Bonfield, supra note 18, at 119, 126-28 (1971).
As part of his work on the Administrative Conference study of the categorical
exemptions, Bonfield urged that the absolute exemptions of section 553(a) be replaced
with reliance on the good cause exemptions. See Bonfield, supra note 30, at 309, 355-57
(use of good cause exemptions in military or foreign affairs rulemaking); Bonfield, Public
Participation in FederalRulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits,
or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 608-11 (1970). Section 553(a) exempts rulemaking
relating to military and foreign affairs, agency management and personnel, public
property, loans, grants, benefits, and contracts from notice and comment requirements.
Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1970). In defending these
recommendations against attacks similar to the ones he had leveled against removing the
categorical exemptions for interpretative rules and general statements of policy, Bonfield
made two general arguments: First, he noted that the rationales behind the attacks apply
to rulemaking in general and not to the exempted categories in particular; second, he
argued that since uncertainty and increased burden apply to only some of the exempted
rules, not the categories as a whole, the use of the good cause exemptions can solve most
problems. See Bonfield, supra note 30, at 271-75; Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal
Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, supra at
575-82. These defenses apply with equal force to the proposal to remove the exemptions of
interpretative rules and general statements of policy.
40. But see Bonfield, supra note 18, at 126-27 (use of good cause exemptions in place of
categorical interpretative rules and general statements of policy exemptions wonld
subvert purpose of good cause exemptions as qualified exemptions to be used in case-bycase analysis rather than as wholesale exemptions).
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complete elimination, of public procedures. An objection to the
procedural rule approach is that agencies would place all presently
exempt rulemaking in the good cause categories.41 Such action by an
agency, however, would certainly be subject to judicial review for abuse
of discretion, and such review would be facilitated by the written
justification that must accompany a good cause determination. Categorical good cause exclusions, a_ccompanied by the reasons for exemption
from notice and comment, would permit both judicial review and
public scrutiny of the good cause determination.
JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF FLEXIBLE PuBLIC PROCEDURES
FOR INTERPRETATIVE RuLES AND GENERAL 8rATEMENTS
OF POLICY

Absent repeal of the categorical exemptions, neither the APA42 nor,
in most cases, the Constitution43 requires notice and comment
procedures for nonlegislative rules. Judicial examination of the procedures for promulgating interpretative rules and general statements of
policy, however, should not end with such a determination. The trend
in administative law is toward a closer scrutiny of the processes for
making informal decisions. 44 Several cases have suggested that the APA
notice and comment procedures for legislative rules constitute only a
minimum standard upon which a court can require further particu-

41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 82, 87 (5th Cir. 1974) (interpretation of
existing regulations permissible unless fails to fit within language of the regulations);
Garelick Mfg. Co. v. Dillion, 313 F.2d 899, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (regulation
interpreting a prior regulation may be issued without notice or comment); Gibson Wine
Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (ruling explaining prior regulation is
interpretative and notice and comment not required).
43. See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944) (hearing not constitutionally
required for rent control regulation); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F .2d 676, 694
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949) (no constitutional right to hearing on
interpretative regulation). The Second Circuit in Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing
Authority did suggest that due process might require notice and comment procedures in
the proper circumstances. 479 F.2d 1165, 1169-70 (2d Cir. 1973). A better approach to rule·
making would be to avoid an abstract constitutional discussion and concentrate on a
pragmatic determination of the benefits to be derived from public procedures. Under the
modem approach to due process, a strong pragmatic argument for public procedures may
result in a determination that some procedures are required by the due process clause if
there is a significant impact on a sufficiently important private interest. See Friendly,
"SomeKindofHearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV.1267, 1278 (1975) (degree of procedural safeguards required for due process varies directly with importance of private interest and
need for and usefulness of particular safeguard in given circumstances and inversely with
burden and adverse consequences of the safeguard).
44. See Clagett, Infonnal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Some Recent
Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 53·67; Friendly, supra
note 43, at 1305-15.
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larized procedures.45 In the area of interpretative rules and general
statements of policy, where the APA requires no public procedures, a
judicial examination of the desirability of additional procedures would
be appropriate. As a practical matter, many interpretative rules and
general statements of policy have a substantial effect on the public; and
although such rules do not have the force of legislative rules, most of
the affected persons will have no forum, other than the agency, in
which to challenge the rule. The practical unavailability of substantive
review makes the need for participation in the policymaking process
even more critical.46
THE REQUIREMENT OFFAIRNESS

Even though an agency's interpretative rule or general statement of
policy falls within an exemption from section 553 procedures, judicial
notions of fairness to those affected by such a rule may require that
some sort of public procedures be employed. Two opinions by Judge
Leventhal of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit suggest the development of an expanded, but
pragmatic, view of procedural requirements for nonlegislative rules,
based on the concept of fairness. A similar motivation underlies
opinions applying the "substantial impact" test in their determination
of whether public procedures are necessary.
In Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association v. SEC47 appellants, an unincorporated association of securities brokers and dealers
and several of its members, brought an action alleging that requests by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that the New York
Stock Exchange "voluntarily" abolish customer-directed "give-ups"
were, in fact, orders and not mere requests.48 Judge Leventhal, writing
for the majority, found that because the requests were general
statements of policy, neither the Securities Exchange Act of 193449 nor
45. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (procedures required
will depend on rule in question); Mobil Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251-54 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (APA provides minimum protection); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615, 629-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (issue presented will dictate procedures required).

The need for procedures in addition to notice and comment in legislative rulemaking has
also been advocated by commentators. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 43, at 1314-15.
46. But cf. Bonfield, supra note 18, at 122 (less need for public participation in formulation of interpretative rules and general statements of policy than in legislative rules).
47. 442 F .2d 132 (D.C. Cir.),cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971).
48. Id. at 134. Give-ups are fees directed by large investors, especially institutional
investors, as payments to brokers not actually concerned with the sale for services
rendered, such as research. I d. By means of its informal written request process, the SEC
encouraged the Exchange to voluntarily change its minimum fee schedule for large
investors and to abolish customer-directed give-ups. I d. at 137.
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a·hh (1970).
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the APA could be read to require notice and participation. 50 Although
the SEC's request was not subject to the general requirement of notice
and opportunity for hearing, the court considered whether in certain
instances "it was incumbent on the Commission to provide such notice
as a matter of elementary fairness" 51 and concluded that fairness may
require that those materially affected have a reasonable opportunity for
comment. 52 In the case before it the court found that ample
opportunity for comment was available because the parties had notice
that the Commission was considering action in this area and because
prior proposed rulemaking gave the parties opportunity to submit their
views to the Commission.53
Judge Leventhal further developed the fairness requirement in
Thompson v. Washington. 54 Although the case did not involve
rulemaking, the opinion helps define the role of judicial review in
determining when fairness may require additional procedures not
prescribed by statute. Thompson involved the rights of public housing
tenants to challenge HUD approval of a rent increase for a privately
operated, but federally assisted, housing project.55 As in Independent
Broker-Dealers, the court was not deterred by the absence of statutory
procedures and found that fairness alone may require notice and an
opportunity to submit comments.56 The court in Thompson did not
engage in an abstract constitutional analysis, but instead struck a
careful balance between the practical considerations involved in the
need for additional procedures. In striking this balance, the court stated
that fairness requires additional procedures where a person denied
notice and comment faces the likelihood that an interest will be injured
by government action.57 Notwithstanding the substantiality of the
50. 442 F.2d at 144.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. I d. at 144-45. The Seventh Circuit in Steams Electric Paste Co. v. EPA utilized the
same examination of the need for additional procedures for the formulation of an inter·
pretative rule. 461 F.2d 293, 304 (7th Cir. 1972). While the APA did not require the agency
to solicit comments, the court found the agency's solicitation proper and appropriate in
order to give industry-wide notice of its proposed position. I d. Thus, the court found that
the agency had done all that was necessary in the interest offairness. !d.
54. 497 F .2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
55. I d. at 628. Thompson is also significant in that it provides a right to some kind of
hearing where there was no direct government action. Jd. at 637. The law seemed to be to
the contrary. See Langevin v. Chenago Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 1971)
(insufficient FHA involvement in approval of rent increase).
56. 497 F.2d at 638·39; see Independent Broker·Dealers' Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d
132, 144 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971).
57. 497 F.2d at 638. In Marine Space Enclosure, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n the
court seemed to place the burden of justifying the absence of a hearing in legislative rule·
making on the agency rather than having the person desiring a hearing prove its necessity.
420 F.2d 577, 586-87 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Since the additional procedures are not required
by statute for interpretative rules and general statements of policy, the burden should be
on the party urging their use.
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interest or the likelihood of deprivation, the court would not compel an
opportunity to participate if the "tenants could make no contribution
relevant to the decisionmaking."58 Though the court's decision in
Thompson may be interpreted as employing a due process analysis, the
court's constitutional discussion of the tenants' affected interests only
served to guide the practical analysis which led to its decision. The
court explicitly refused to base its decision on constitutional grounds,
and stated that it was interpreting the National Housing Act of 193759
to reach a conclusion that would avoid serious doubt as to the Act's
constitutionality. 60 The court relied on "basic fairness, discerned in the
light of the contemporary regulatory climate." 61 Nothing is more
within the competence of a court than the exploration of procedural
requirements to guarantee fairness. Similar attention to the realistic,
practical requirements of fairness must guide courts in prescribing
additional procedures for the formulation of interpretative rules and
general statements of policy.
The decision to require notice and comment procedures involves
practical considerations; a sound general principle is that fairness
requires procedures in addition to those explicitly imposed by Congress
where a court finds that the increased validity of the agency
decisionmaking process outweighs the procedural burden. This general
principle should guide the decision concerning what additional procedures are required as well as the decision whether or not to impose
,.
additional procedures.
One of the factors in making this determination is the degree of
impact that an agency decision would have on the interests of the
public or of private individuals. A number of decisions have focused
solely on this factor by applying a "substantial impact" test in
determining whether to require public procedures. Under the substantial impact test, the agency must follow public procedures where rules
would have a substantial impact on the affected parties. 62 Employing
analysis similar to the fairness ·approach, two leading cases indicate that
the test may aid the determination of whether additional procedures
would be appropriate for substantive rules exempt from section 553
procedural requirements. Other courts, however, use the test as a
definitional tool to determine whether a rule is subject to section 553
58. 497F.2dat638.
59. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1401-36 (1970).
60. 497 F .2d at 633, 639.
61. Id.
62. See National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90,95-96
(D.D.C. 1967) (three judge court); Note, The Legislative-Interpretative Distinction:
SemanticFeintingwithanException toRulemaking Procedures, 54 N.C.L. REV.421, 425
(1976).
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procedures. This second approach is incorrect because not all rules can
be said to be legislative and because nowhere in the language or history
of the APA is the degree of impact used to define legislative rules and
thereby the coverage of section 553. The distinction between the two
approaches is not merely academic: defining a rule as legislative means
that the court must limit itself to the arbitrary or capricious standard of
review and must inflexibly require full section 553 compliance.
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association v. Finch, 63 which involved
the FDA's effort to promulgate drug effectiveness regulations, is one of
the foundation cases in the development of the substantial impact test.
The challenged regulation required adequate and well-controlled clinical
investigation by the manufacturer to prove the effectiveness of a
dreg. 64 The court expressly avoided an attempt to label the regulation
legislative or interpretative under section 553 despite the agency's
categorical determination that the rule was procedural and interpretative. 65 In holding that notice and comment procedures were required,
the court did not use the substantial impact test to categorize the
regulation under section 553, but instead relied on the basic policy of
that section.66 The court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers recognized
that section 553 is but a statutory reflection of the fairness requirement
"that when a proposed regulation of general applicability has a
substantial impact on the regulated industry, or an important class of
the members or the products of that industry, notice and opportunity
for comment should first~ be provided." 67 Applying this standard, the
court examined the pervasiveness of the regulation and the complexity
of the subject matter and determined that notice and comment
procedures were necessary. 68
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers opinion relied on two cases to
support its use of the substantial impact test. In Texaco, Inc. v. FPC69
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
good cause exemption of section 553 was not applicable to an FPC
order amending a regulation governing the computation of interest on
63. 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del.1970).
64. I d. at 859·60. The regulations provided that the FDA could remove a drug from the
market for lack of substantial evidence of effectiveness and that a hearing on that removal
would be granted only where the manufacturer had shown an ability to produce
substantial evidence of the drug's effectiveness.Id.
65. I d. at 869.
66. Seeid.
67. Id.
68. I d. at 864·68. The court noted contradictions in the standards of evidence required
to establish efficacy, the uncertain relationship of drug studies by the National Academy
of Sciences·National Research Council (NAS-NRCI to the enacted FDA standardil and
procedures, and the backlog of unreleased NAS-NRC drug study reports. I d.
69. 412 F .2d 740 (3d Cir.1969).
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refunds ordered by the agency.70 The FPC did not contend that the
form of rule employed was exempt from section 553; rather, the
agency argued that notice and comment procedures were unnecessary
and could be dispensed with for good cause. 71 The court correctly
stated that where there is a substantial impact, notice and comment
procedures cannot be called unnecessary.72 Although the court mentioned that section 553 procedures will cover rules with a substantial
impact, its holding relied upon the traditional definitions of legislative
rules and of the coverage of section 553.73 In National Motor Freight
Traffic Association v. United States, 74 however, the three judge district
court used the substantial impact test to determine that a rule was not
an interpretative rule exempt from section 553.75 Stating that section
553 notice and comment is necessary whenever an agency takes
regulatory action of general importance to the regulated industry and
the public, the court nullified an ICC regulation that established
procedures for the restoration to shippers of previously declared illegal
charges because the ICC was taking a significant step in the implementation of a newly created remedy.76
Perhaps National Motor Freight, like Pharmaceutical Manufacturers,
can be said to have used the substantial impact test merely to establish
the need for procedures; if not, the opinion incorrectly applied the test.
The test is not a valid method for determining whether section 553
applies, nor is it appropriate for distinguishing legislative rules from
interpretative rules and general statements of policy. Section 553
70. I d. at 741-42.
71. I d. at 743.
72. I d. The court found the amendment was neither minor nor issued in an emergency
situation. I d.
73. Id. at 744-45. The court concluded that "procedures must be followed when an
agency is exercising its legislative function in order that its rules have the force of law."
Id. at744.
74. 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1967) (three judge court), affd mem., 393 U.S. 18 (1968).
75. I d. at 95-97. Several courts have incorrectly relied on the substantial impact test to
determine whether specific rulemaking is subject to the notice and comment requirements
of section 553. See, e.g., American Bancorporation, Inc. v. Federal Reserve System, 509
F.2d 29, 33-35 (8th Cir. 1974) (notice and comment procedures not required where rule
amendment had no substantial impact); Pickus v. Board of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112-13
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (parole qualification regulations having a substantial impact on parole
decisions not interpretative rules); Noel v. Green, 376 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
affd, 508 F .2d 1023 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 37 (1975) (notice and comment pro·
cedures not required where no substantial impact on rights of parties challenging rule);
Akron, C. & Y. R.R. v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (D. Md. 1974) (section 553
procedures required where rule arguably had substantial impact). The Fourth Circuit
recently held that compliance with the notice and publication requirements of section 553
is necessary when the regulations have a "drastic impact." See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F .2d
215,222 (4th Cir.1975).
76. 268 F. Supp. at 97.
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specifically exempts interpretative rules and general statements of
policy.77 The court in National Motor Freight did not explain the
relevance of the substantial impact test in defining these categories.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon 78 demonstrates that an interpretative rule may have an enormous impact and
still be validly issued without notice and comment. The Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) had followed a policy of qualifying hospitals as
charitable organizations only if they provided free or low cost service to
the poor. 79 The IRS, without notice and comment, changed the policy
in 1969 by issuing a new revenue ruling that allowed hospitals to
qualify as charitable organizations without providing such free or below
cost service. 80 The District of Columbia Circuit held, with no mention
of the substantial impact test, that the ruling was interpretative and not
subject to the procedural requirements of section 553.81
Dissenting to the denial of rehearing en bane, Chief Judge
Bazelon argued that a court should consider whether it would be bound
by the rule and that since courts give special deference to revenue
rulings, thus precluding meaningful judicial review, notice and comment
procedures should be required. 82 Chief Judge Bazelon's view of the
requirements of section 553 is incorrect; the potential deference that a
court may give an interpretative rule does not overturn the explicit
77. Administrative Procedure Act§ 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) (A) (1970); see A'IT'Y GEN.'S
MANUAL, supra note 4, at 30 & n.3 (procedures required for rules "issued by an agency
pursuant to statutory authority").
The difference that the reviewing court's choice of either the conventional test or the
substantial impact test can make on the determination whether section 553 applies is
important. See, e.g., Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 337 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972). In Lewis-Mota the plaintiffs based their procedural
· challenge to a directive that resulted in the denial of their visas on the substantial impact
test. I d. at 1294. In rejecting the use of the test, the district court noted that in deter·
mining the applicability of section 553, the more conventional test is whether the rule in
question is a legislative rule. I d. at 1294. Applying the conventional test, the court found
that the rule before it was not legislative and therefore that section 553 procedures were
not required. Id. at 1294-95. The Second Circuit reversed, relying heavily on the
substantial impact test to support a requirement of section 553 procedures. 469 F.2d at
482.
78. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other Krounds, 44
U.S.L.W. 4724 (U.S. June 1, 1976).
79. I d. at 1280 & n.5.
80. I d. at 1280-81.
81. I d. at 1290.
82. I d. at 1292-93 (Bazelon, C.J., with Wright & Robinson, JJ., dissenting to denial of
rehearing en bane). Judge Wright also dissented to the denial of rehearing en bane and
argued that because the ruling substantially changed the availability of hospital services
for the poor, it must comply with the public rulemaking procedures required by section
553. I d. (Wright, J ., with Bazelon, C.J. & Robinson, J., dissenting to denial of rehearing en
bane). Judge Wright asserted that millions of poor people would be denied needed medical
care without the procedural protections provided by law.Id.
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statutory language. On the other hand, his analysis is consistent with
the defensible view that, because of the special deference, notions of
fairness may require some public participation. One factor to consider
in determining whether fairness requires judicially imposed procedures
may be the weight given particular exempt rules on review, but this one
factor does not transform an interpretative rule into a legislative rule.
A major wealmess of contrived definitions such as the substantial
impact test or Chief Judge Bazelon's substantial deference analysis is
that, in manipulating the definitions of interpretative rules and general
statements of policy for the purpose of imposing public procedures, a
court subjects the rule to a more limited scope of review. Pickus v.
Board of Parole 83 illustrates the impact that the definitional approach
may have on the scope of review. Pickus involved rules promulgated by
the Parole Board for use in determining eligibility for parole. 84 The
court required section 553 procedures by distinguishing the parole rules
from general statements of policy, interpretative rules, and procedural
rules. The rules could not be classified as general statements of policy
because they were designed to have a substantial effect on parole
decisions; the rules were not interpretative because they did not
construe the statute, but operated instead as controls over the exercise
of the Board's discretion.85 The court held that because the rules had
the force of law and could be reviewed only for arbit:iariness, they were
not the kind of rules that Congress meant to exempt from the notice
and comment requirements of section 553.86 The court's analysis was
backwards; it failed to make an initial determination whether Congress
had granted legislative rulemaking authority to the Board. Had it made
such an inquiry, the court would have found that the Board had no
authority to make legislative rules in this area;87 thus, the rules were
either interpretative rules or general statements of policy. Since the
Board had no legislative rulemaking power, the court was not justified
in holding that section 553 procedures were required.
By making the determination that the rules were legislative, the court
in Pickus ironically limited the scope of its review of the substance of
83. 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir.1974).
84. I d. at 1108.
85. Id. at 1112·13.
86. See id. at 1112·13. Individual parole decisions are within the absolute, unreviewable
discretion of the Board. Nothing prevents courts, however, from reviewing the means by
which parole criteria are promulgated and, in the case of interpretative rules, substituting
their judgment. Instead, the court in Pickus stated that it could review the substance of
the parole criteria for "arbitrariness," which would be the appropriate scope of review were
the criteria legislative rules. I d.
87. The Board's enabling legislation only authorizes limited rulemaking power. See 18
U.S.C. § 4208( d) (1970) (supervision of paroled prisoners); id. § 5009 (procedures for Youth
Correction Division of Board).
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the rules to whether the rules were arbitrary or capricious, the standard
of review for legislative rules. 88 In defining the rules as legislative, the
court achieved the beneficial effect of requiring public participation at
the cost of unnecessarily limiting broad review of the substance of the
parole criteria. Consistent with its expressed aims, the court could have
found that the parole criteria were interpretative rules having only.
persuasive effect and subject to de novo judicial review. 89 The court
then could have found that the substantial impact of the rules and
fairness to the affected parties required public procedures. Thus, the
court could have imposed procedures on the rulemaking process
without violating the APA and also could have retained the power to
review the substance of the rules.
A second weakness with the courts' use of the substantial impact test
to define which rules must comply with section 553 is that it needlessly
eliminates flexibility in the type of procedures required. Under this
approach, once a substantial impact is shown, the agency must fully
comply with the notice and comment requirements of section 553.
Under the fairness approach, the court can apply a practical analysis
not only to the decision to require additional procedures, but also to
the choice of the type of procedures to require. An almost unlimited
choice of procedures can be matched to the variety of situations for
nonlegislative rulemaking. 90 A court need not always require full
compliance with section 553; in some instances only a written

88. See note 9 supra.
89. See note 15 supra.
90. But cf. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235·36 (1974) (dictum) (interpretative rule
invalid unless published in the Federal Register); Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d
757, 763·64 n.12 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974) (same); Bone v. Hibernia
Bank, 493 F.2d 135, 139-40 (9th Cir. 1974) (same). Contrary to these cases, however,
section 552(a) may not require Federal Register publication for interpretative rules.
Section 552(a) (1) (D) requires publication of "substantive rules of general applicability
adopted as authorized by law and statements of general policy or interpretations of
general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency." Administrative Procedure
Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1970). The phrase "substantive rules of general
applicability adopted as authorized by law" is a good definition of legislative rules. See
notes 4, 7 supra. The drafters must have intended to exclude interpretative rules by the
term "adopted as authorized by law" or that term has no purpose; it would be absurd for a
statute to specify that illegally adopted legislative rules need not be published. The term
therefore must distinguish interpretative rules from legislative rules. See ATT'Y GEN.'S
MANUAL, supra note 4, at 30 n.3 (substantive rules defined as legislative rules). The second
phrase "statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability" seems to
refer to a distinct class. The word "rule" is not used; thus the "interpretations" do not
seem to include interpretative rules for the drafters used the specific term "interpretative
rules" in section 553.
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statement justifying an exempt action would be adequate. 91 Open
conferences between the agency and interested parties may be
sufficient where the action solely or primarily affects easily recognizable groups.92 A rule sometimes could be made effective immediately without notice or comment, but the agency would have to
accept comments on the final rule and to consider amendments in light
of those comments. An agency also might promulgate an exempt rule
without public procedures, but a section 553 proceeding for amendment or reconsideration could be required at some later date.93 The
numerous types of public procedures make it likely that in a given
situation some combination should adequately accommodate the
competing values of efficiency, sound decisionmaking, and fairness.
Professor Davis wrote in another context that "when we are limited to
choosing between all and none, we sometimes choose none; if we had a
choice among all, some, and none, we might sometimes choose some
instead of none." 94 Judges must always remember, however, that in
some cases, the best alternative may be no public procedures at all.
Although an agency's rule or statement falls within an exemption to
the procedural requirements of section 553, fairness may in certain
cases require public participation. The substantial impact test may
represent a movement toward the application of the fairness approach.
Where an exempt, or possibly exempt, rule has a substantial impact on
91. Public participation causes most of the problems which justify exempting
interpretative rules and general statements of policy from section 553. The requirement of
an adequate statement of basis and purpose does not seem to present nearly the same
problems, and findings and reasons should be required even when other procedures are not
appropriate. This approach is consistent with the trend towards requiring written
justification for informal action. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973) (per
curiam) (reviewing court should obtain affidavits or testimony from agency if failure to
explain administrative action frustrates effective judicial review); cf. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 805..08, 817 (1973) (to support an order varying
from past policy, ICC must make its reasons clear to reviewing court). But cf.
Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp., 421 U.S.168, 191-92 (1975) (because
Congress exempted Board from most provisions of APA, need not disclose reasons for
decisions). A written justification statement provides an internal check on agency action
and permits informal criticism. See Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486
F.2d 98, 105..06 (3rd Cir. 1973). See generally Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of
Rules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative
Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV.1276, 1333·36 (1972).
92. See S. Doc. No.8, supra note 9, at 103..05 (consultations and conferences with
interested private parties may be as adequate as formal hearing).
93. SeeS. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 200 (where agency action beneficial to the
public does not become effective until issuance of a rule, the rule may be immediately
issued and supplemental proceedings and reconsideration will satisfy the procedural
requirements).
94. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.07, at 169 (1972) (discussing the
imposition of trial-type procedures for legislative rulemaking).
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the rights or obligations of those affected, fairness justifies consideration of imposing public procedures, but exempt substantive rules may
have a substantial impact and still properly be promulgated without
public procedures or, at least without full section 553 compliance. The
fairness of the procedural process employed in formulating interpretative rules and general statements of policy should be considered where
public participation would contribute to reasoned decisionmaking and
where the benefits of a public procedure outweigh its potential
detriments.
Although the value of the fairness approach is demonstrable, a court
should apply the concept cautiously and thoughtfully. The exemptions
to the APA were selected for sound reasons, and a court should
consider these reasons before imposing procedures. Agencies should be
able to promulgate rules with some confidence that they have chosen
procedures that will survive judicial review. Courts should avoid
burdening the administration of government by creating unnecessary
confusion as to procedural requirements. Since too much procedure
may be as harmful as too little, notice and comment procedures should
not be required where participation would serve no practical purpose.95
By focusing on the practical need to protect affected persons through
participation in the rulemaking process, courts need not rely on
strained definitions and abstract labels.
THE REQUIREMENT OF AN ADEQUATE
INFORMATION-GATHERING PROCESS

In addition to notions of fairness, courts should also examine
whether additional public procedures for the promulgation of exempt
rules will significantly increase the information upon which the agency
bases its decision. A fairness determination weighs the effect of the
agency's failure to solicit and consider the views of those members of
the public potentially harmed, but that determination may not be
enough. Agencies also have a duty to educate themselves fully before
issuing an interpretative rule or a general statement of policy. Fairness
requires that all substantially affected parties have some procedure for
participation, but only the best possible decision on the merits can
protect the vaguer interests of the public in general. Such a decision can
best be ensured by employing the most effective information-gathering
process that is practical under the circumstances. Consequently, the
multifaceted issues confronted in most policy decisions compel
';J,~

95. See Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 640·41 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (effect of rent

i increase on tenants in public housing warranted use of notice and comment procedures).
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consideration of whether the agency abused its discretion in the choice
of procedures used to gather relevant information. 96 The District of
Columbia Circuit has declared that an agency must "realistically tailor
the proceedings to fit the issues before it, the information it needs to
illuminate the issues and the manner of presentation ...." 97
The Supreme Court in essence conducted such a· review in NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co. 98 Dealing with the Second Circuit's efforts to
require notice and comment procedures in National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) policymaking, the Court disagreed with the Board's
interpretation of a key term, "managerial employees," but would not
require that the Board undertake legislative rulemaking as the only
means of defining the term.99 The Second Circuit had held that the
Board must conduct legislative rulemaking because any new exclusion
from the term would be a "general rule" which effected a substantial
change in the law designed to apply to all cases.100 The Supreme Court
noted that in SEC v. Chenery (Chenery II)1° 1 and NLRB v. WymanGordon Co. 102 it had permitted the formulation of general policy in the
context of an adjudicative process.103 Though the Court treated the
conflict as one between "rules" and adjudicative "rules of law," its
decision effectively sanctioned the formulation of prospective general
policy, "rules," without notice and comment procedures.104 The
rationale for permitting the Board the choice between rulemaking and
adjudicative procedures rested on the Board's discretion to determine
whether it had sufficient information to make an informed policy
judgment.105 The Court's review of the exercise of that discretion
suggests that courts should inquire into the adequacy of the information-gathering process regardless of the type of rule. The Court focused
on whether rulemaking 'vithout notice and comment procedures can
adequately inform the agency so as to constitute a reasonable exercise
of administrative policymaking.106 The Court reasoned that although
section 553 procedures would provide the Board with a forum for
soliciting the informed views of those affected, the Board reasonably
96. See generaUy Clagett, supra note 44.
97. Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074
(1972).
98. 416 u.s. 267 (1974).
99. I d. at 294-95.
100. I d. at 292.
101. 332 U.S.194 (1947).
102. 394 u.s. 759 (1969).
103. 416 U.S. at 292-94.
104. I d. at 292-95.
105. Id. at 294-95.
106. Id.
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could conclude that "adjudicative procedures may also produce the
relevant information necessary to mature and fair consideration of the
issues."107 Because the Board had not abused its discretion in
determining that adequate information could be and had been acquired
through adjudication, the Court permitted the agency to formulate
policy in an adjudicative context. Under this reasoning, courts must
review for abuse of discretion the information-gathering processes used
by agencies in formulating nonlegislative rules, including those made in
the course of agency adjudication, and this review must include a
determination of the adequacy of the information upon which the
agency relied.
Recognition in the legislative history of the APA that agency
discretion in the choice of procedure should be limited to processes
that are "useful to them or helpful to the public" supports judicial
review of information-gathering procedures for abuse of discretion. 108
Although section 553 procedures were intended to enable an agency to
educate itself and to assure the public an opportunity to participate, 109
the exemption of certain types of rules from section 553's coverage
does not indicate that Congress intended that agencies ignore the values
of education and public participation gained from the informationgathering necessary in making such rules. The stringency of the
information-gathering requirement should vary with the importance of
the rule and the practicalities of the situation. Rules with substantial
impact, for example, may give rise to judicial imposition of public
procedures because the agency developing such rules should obtain all
realistically available information.U 0 The impact of a rule may be one
factor dictating the relative need for information, but both agencies and
courts should scrutinize every process employed in making interpretative rules and general statements of policy to ensure that the process
is capable of producing and did produce sufficient information. The
ideal of fully informed policymaking, however, should not be adhered
to blindly; the proper amount of information is a function of the needs
of the policy decision, and the ideal must be tempered by a great many
practical considerations.
A procedure that would result in the largest accumulation of
accurate information may not be necessary or realistic for many policy
107. I d. at 295.
108. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 200, 258.
109. See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969); Pacific Coast European
Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197,205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 958 (1965).
110. See Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972) (lack of
procedures precluded notice of defects
difficulties in order). See generally Comment, A
Functional Approach to the Applicability of Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure
Act to Agency Statements ofPolicy, 43 U. CHI L. REV. 430, 451-53 (1976).

ana
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pronouncements. An attempt to amass perfectly complete information
in many instances would interfere with the efficient operation of the
Government and would cost more than the value of any benefit from
improved decisionmaking. In determining the adequacy of the information-gathering that must support a decision, therefore, the cost of
obtaining information should be balanced against the significance of the
rule and the potential utility of additional information. The agency
must be primarily responsible for striking this balance; the reviewing
court should accord great weight to an agency's determination. 111
Nonetheless, in reviewing for abuse of discretion, the court may provide
needed guidance as to the minimum standards of agency education
necessary for identifiable categories of interpretative rules and general
statements of policy.
OBJECTIONS TO THE IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL
PROCEDURES

There are three major objections to imposing public participation in
the promulgation of interpretative rules and general statements of
policy: the burden of public procedure will encourage "secret policy";
the APA specifically excludes these two rules from procedural
requirements; and ad hoc imposition of procedures will cause agency
uncertainty as to the type of procedures that will satisfy reviewing
courts. Although these are strong arguments, they do not compel the
conclusion that courts should not, or cannot, impose some procedures
on interpretative rules and general statements of policy.
SECRET POLICY

The recommendation of additional procedures for interpretative
rules and general statements of policy must overcome the danger that
the procedural burden will discourage administrative efforts to develop
and disclose policy.Uz Professor Davis has called notice and comment
111. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294·95 (1974).
112. Decisions interpreting the Freedom of Information Act require that agencies
disclose any documents that contain "secret law." See Schwartz v. IRS, 511 F.2d 1303, ·
1305 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (no exemption where internal memoranda represent policies,
statements, or interpretations of adopted agency law); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450
F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (orders and interpretations that actually apply in cases
before agency must be disclosed); Freedom of Information Act§ 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970);
Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 797 (1967) ..
The Act does not require the formulation or consolidation of policy. Much policy exists in
the minds of the decisionmakers or in numerous internal documents. Rulemaking will
disclose this policy; the Freedom of Information Act cannot. Although a hard-working
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rulemaking one of the greatest inventions of modem government, 113
but even this highly efficient procedure may be excessively burdensome
for much of the rulemaking that agencies undertake. To avoid such a
burden, an agency may simply choose to avoid promulgating an
interpretative rule or general statement of policy. Any procedure that
may encourage secret policy should be suspect; open agency policy has
been an important trend in recent administrative law theory, and
interpretative rules and general statements of policy are often the best
and most efficient means for publicly announcing agency policy.
The District of Columbia Circuit, in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v.
FPC, 114 recently recognized that the desire for open policy may justify
excepting general statements of policy from procedural requirements.U5 The statements of policy in Pacific Gas contained the FPC's
suggested means for establishing natural gas curtailment priorities in the
event of a shortage.U 6 Although the statements had the potential to
revise outstanding natural gas contracts, the court feared that the
imposition of public procedures would inhibit the disclosure, rather
than improve the formulation, of curtailment policy. The court noted
that the Commission could have proceeded on an ad hoc basis and
tentatively approved specific curtailment plans that were found to be
just and reasonable instead of formulating a general policy statement. 117
Had the Commission proceeded in an ad hoc manner, the only
difference from promulgating the policy statement "would be that the
Commission would be acting under a secret policy rather than under
the publicized guidelines ...." 118
The performance of routine administrative duties requires that
agencies make numerous policy pronouncements, which often take the
form of interpretative rules or general statements of policy. An active
agency will formulate hundreds of policies in such forms as internal

member of the public may use the Information Act to obtain material from which to glean
some idea of an agency's policy, nothing can replace the conscious formulation and
disclosure of policy by the agency. Discouraging agencies from policy formulation and
disclosure will have a substantial detrimental impact even with the Information Act.
113. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 65 (1969), See
generally Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the
Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 535·36 (1972) (distinguishes between informal,
formal, and adjudicative rulemaking proceedings in terms of pressure groups'
preferences).
114. 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.1974).
115. Id. at41.
116. I d. at 35·36.
117. I d. at 41.
118. Id.
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staff guidelines119 and policy instructions.120 Requiring additional
procedures for this mass of pronouncements would overburden the
agency process, increase the expense of government, and greatly
lengthen the time necessary for the Government to respond to public
problems.121 The public suffers when administrative agency action is
unduly inhibited or made overly expensive. Public participation will not
always improve agency decisionmaking enough to offset the costs of
imposing the procedure.l 22
The inherent friction between the desirability of public input and the
need for 'POlicy formulation and disclosure b~comes particularly acute
in light of the modern trend to require rules and rulemaking. Required
rulemaking serves two values: disclosure of general agency policy, and
the opportunity for public participation in the formulation of the
policy. Efforts to increase public participation in policy formulation
cannot be permitted to unduly interfere with judicial efforts to nurture
the consolidation and disclosure of general agency policy. Commentators, for example, have vehemently criticized the NLRB for its
reluctance to use rulemaking.l2 3 Though critics attack the Board for its
efforts to avoid public procedures by not promulgating legislative rules
through notice and comment procedures/ 24 one cannot ignore the
Board's numerous efforts to formulate and disclose policy through
other types of rules. Legislative rulemaking through section 553
procedures is a valuable technique and is preferable in many situations,
but the role of interpretative rules and general statements of policy in
the Board's policymaking arsenal is equally clear. The NLRB's
nonlegislative rule requiring that employers furnish unions with a list of
employees before an election to select a bargaining r-epresentative,
119. See Nader v. Butterfield, 373 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (D.D.C. 1974) (mem.) (FAA
approval of X-ray inspection methods not mere internal memoranda where authorization
of use given).
120. See Noel v. Green, 376 F. Supp.1095, 1099 (S.D.N.Y.1974),a{fd, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d
Cir. 1975 ), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 37 (1975) (instructions relating to exercise of discretion in
certification of voluntarily departing aliens).
121. Bonfield, supra note 18, at 118 (adverse effects of imposing section 553 procedures
on policy issuauces and statutory constructions).
122. I d. at 118-19,
123. See, e.g., Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 573 (1970); Peck, A Critique of the
National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and
Rulemaking, 117 U. PA. L. REV.254, 260 (1968); Peck, TheAtrophiedRule-Making Powers
oftheNationalLaborRelationsBoard, 70YALEL.J. 729(1961).
124. One reason for the NLRB's reluctance to pursue section 553 rulemaking is the
Board's unique political situation. The Board understandably seeks to avoid the titanic
clash between big labor and big business in a public rulemaking. Case-by-case adjudication
avoids turning the decisionmaking process into a political pressure cooker.
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adopted in the process of the adjudication of Excelsior Underwear,
Inc., 125 could have been a legislative rule. The Board could have
discontinued the adjudicative proceeding and shifted to section 553
rulemaking or severed the general policymaking consideration from the
specific adjudication.
The Supreme Court reviewed the rule adopted in Excelsior and the
process employed in formulating the rule in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co. 126 The plurality opinion severely criticized the Board for its
reluctance to make rules through public procedures.127 The majority
holding, however, reversed the First Circuit's decision that the Board
acted improperly in promulgating the Excelsior rule without notice and
comment.128 1'he Court based its decision on theNLRB'sreliance upon
an adjudicative determination, independent of the Excelsior rule, that
Wyman-Gordon should produce a list of employees. 129 The majority
reasoned that the NLRB had the authority to make such an
adjudicative determination in an individual case and that the existence
of a rule relating to the same subject, whether legally promulgated or
not, would not support reversal of the NLRB's action. 130
An alternative ground for the decision in Wyman-Gordon could have
been that the Excelsior rule was not intended to be a legislative rule.
The Court might have found that the Board only intended to develop
and disclose general policy by which to guide future action, and to this
extent, it acted in conformity with the APA and the primary values of
required rulemaking and public disclosure of agency policy. The
systematic formulation and articulation of general policy in some form
of rule is preferable to no policy development or disclosure at all.
Because of the pervasive effect of the Excelsior policy statement,
however, and the absence of a stated reason for not undertaking some
form of general notice ana comment procedure, the Court in
Wyman-Gordon perhaps should have required the NLRB to employ
procedures for public input even though the APA did not require such
stepsol31
.

125. 156 N.L.R.B.1236 (1966).
126. 394 u.s. 759 (1969).
127. Id. at 764·66.
128. I d. at 766.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. The Board did solicit comments from those who might have been affected by the
rule but were not parties to the adjudication, but it did not give general notice and
opportunity to participate. I d. at 763.
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An example of the adverse effects of the failure to formulate and
disclose policy is the NLRB's refusal to openly articulate clear policy in
its handling of discrimination by labor unions. The Board has refused to
announce any policy in this area, even through a nonlegislative rule.
The desirability of some form of rulemaking is clear: the absence of
defined policy creates a substantial problem for labor unions
attempting to comply with the law.132 A court inclined to require
rulemaking for the purpose of disclosing agency policy may be working
against itself by insisting on legislative rulemaking. A court should
require the formulation and articulation of policy, but flexibly view the
type of rule required and the form of agency procedure permitted. In
many instances, either an interpretative rule or a general statement of
policy will serve as well as a legislative rule to define terms or to
consolidate and disclose policy. Efforts to encourage or require
rulemaking must always recognize that any form of policy formulation
may serve, in a specific context, to disclose agency policy and that too
much procedure may have a greater negative impact on that goal than
the additional procedures can offset with increased participation and
greater information.
Careful consideration of the negative impact of additional procedures, such as the potential for secret policy formulation, should
temper the enthusiasm for the imposition of procedural requirements.
To state that a court considering imposition of additional procedures
for exempt substantive rules should weigh these negative factors,
however, is not to say that a court must avoid altogether the imposition
of additional procedures. These countervailing considerations are
important and a court cannot lightly disregard them in considering
additional procedures. Courts can weigh the negative factors against the
benefits that might accrue from additional procedures and strike a
balance, which, if in favor of no procedures, will dictate against
imposition. If the balance tips in favor of abbreviated. procedures, a
court should be free to order whatever public procedures appear
necessary. The analysis that sees only two alternatives, no procedures or
else section 553 procedures, should be replaced with a more flexible
analysis, which, while weighing the negative factors, encourages courts
to consider the positive aspects of a limited form of public participation. Thus, the secret policy objection to the imposition of additional
procedural requirements loses force where the possible detriments of
132. See Comment, Application of Mansion House: Denial of Certification an N.L.R.B.
Dilemma, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 762, 779-83 (1975) (use of rulemaking suggested as
alternative to ad hoc adjudication to promote certainty and uniform standards in NLRB
certification).
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imposed procedures are carefully considered and the additional
procedures may be a modest accommodation to public participation
and informed decisionmaking.
STATUTORY PROIDBITION

The fear that the burden of extra procedures would cause agencies to
keep policies secret contributed to the legislative decision to exempt
interpretative rules and general statements of policy from section
553.133 Because Congress specifically exempted such rules, critics of
additional procedures can argue that the courts may not properly
impose procedures where Congress did not. Nothing in the legislative
history indicates that Congress intended to preclude the judicial
imposition of public procedures. The House Judiciary Committee
reported that:
Agencies are given discretion to dispense with notice (and
consequently with public proceedings) in the case of interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure or practice; but this does not mean
that they should not undertake public procedures in connection with such rulemaking where useful to them or helpful
to the public.134
The drafters of the Act did not preclude the courts from a role in this
determination. Certainly the courts can examine agency action for
abuse of discretion, and the APA provides for this review .135 Thus,
where Congress granted the agency the discretion to forego procedures,
it must have meant for the courts to review the exercise of that
discretion.
Recent decisions refer to section 553 as setting minimum procedures
for -the promulgation of legislative rules. 136 The approach suggested
above, that courts sometimes require public procedures for interpretative rules and general statements of policy, is built on the same
flexible view of the APA as a minimum upon which additional
133. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 16, at 18. Several reasons were cited for the
exemptions: a desire to encourage the promulgation of such rules; recognition that
discretion is necessary given the diverse contents and times of issuance of such rules;
acknowledgment of a procedure by which such rules could be reconsidered; and, the
availability of plenary judicial review of such rules. I d.
134. I d. at 258. The Senate Committee Report contains virtually the same language. I d.
at200.
135. Administrative Procedure Act§ 10( e) (B) (1), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (A) (1970).
136. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251·52 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630·31 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Chicago v. FPC, 458 F .2d 731, 743-44 (D.C. Cir.1971),cert. denied, 405 U.S.1074 (1972).
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procedures should be added where appropriate. This reflects the "new
era" announced by the District of Columbia Circuit in Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 137 in which courts should act to
"ensure that the administrative process itself will confine and control
the exercise of discretion." 138 Part of this process involves assisting the
agencies in developing a "framework for principled decisionmaking."139 An expansion of the procedural horizons for interpretative
rules and general statements of policy clearly conforms to this modern
view of the .APA. Courts in the new era should recognize that agencies
must have broad discretion in the choice of procedures and that the
judiciary should not unduly interfere with the exercise of that
discretion. Nevertheless, the new flexibility in interpreting the .APA
provisions leaves courts free to assume a role in the choice of
procedures. Thus, consistent with the purposes of the .APA, courts can
compel agencies to consider whether additional procedures are necessary to ensure a fair and well-informed decision and can review the
agencies' procedural choices so as to provide judicial guidance in the
exercise of discretion.
UNCERTAINTY

The third objection to judicial imposition of additional procedures is
that agencies would be uncertain, until after judicial review, as to what
procedures to employ in promulgating interpretative rules or general
statements of policy. Reviewing courts making ad hoc procedural
determinations cannot ignore this problem. Judge Wright emphatically
made this point in a recent article dealing with imposition of
procedures in addition to the section 553 requirements for the
promulgation of legislative rules. 140 He objects to the possibility that
"after an agency has fully completed its .consideration and
promulgation of a rule, the reviewing court may demand
reconsideration under procedures which, in retrospect, strike the court
as being appropriate to the issues raised." 141 Thus, concludes Judge
Wright, ad hoc and post facto judicial imposition of public procedures
will waste agency time and effort.142
Although the problem of agency uncertainty affects all post facto
impositions of procedures, regardless of the type of rule, it is less
137.
138.
139.
140.

439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir.1971).
ld. at 598.
ld.
Wright, The Court and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits ofJudicialRelJ!ew, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 375, 384 ( 1974).
141. ld.
142. I d. at 376.
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serious where a court requires some public procedures for the
promulgation of interpretative rules and general statements of policy
than where a court adds the elements of a trial to notice and comment
procedures for legislative rulemaking. Interpretative rules and general
statements of policy express the view of the agency on a part of the law
that it is charged with administering. Interpretative rules and general
statements of policy, unlike legislative rules, still have nearly the same
effect after a court directs an agency to follow additional procedures as
they had before: the opinion of the agency still stands for the guidance
of those affected, even if a court instructs the agency to provide for
public participation. Consequently, the lack of predictability objection
should affect the way courts guide agencies in their procedural
decisions regarding interpretative rules or general statements of policy,
but the objection does not militate against courts requiring some
additional procedures. A conscientious agency, encouraged by judicial
guidance, will be inclined to implement the necessary notice and
comment procedures without ad hoc judicial imposition.
CONCLUSION

New understanding of the procedural possibilities for interpretative
rules and general statements of policy must accompany sound choice of
the use of these rules. Although not now required, the public should
have some opportunity for participating in the formulation and
promulgation of interpretative rules and general statements of policy.
This goal, however, cannot be allowed to engulf the advantages of
employing nonlegislative rules. The agencies should consider some form
of public procedure when the need for public participation or for
improvement in the information-gathering process outweighs the
detriment that might result from additional procedures. The balancing
process must also be utilized when considering the number and kind of
procedures to be appended to the process.
Two possible methods of analysis exist for accomplishing this
balancing. Congress could repeal the categorical exemptions in section
553, and the good cause exemptions could be developed to cover the
realistic needs for abbreviated procedures for these two rules. A better
approach, especially considering the unlikelihood of repeal of the
categorical exemptions, would be the evolution of procedures specially
tailored to the individual forms of exempt rulemaking through notions
of fairness and judicial review for abuse of discretion in the agency's
choice of information-gathering technique.
None of the three major arguments against additional procedures
carries enough force to foreclose consideration, in specific instances, of
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the appropriateness of some public participation. The moderate,
pragmatic approach recommended here will negate these arguments. A
procedure likely to improve agency decisionmaking is worth the added
judicial scrutiny necessary to prevent secret policy, is not contrary to
the intent of the .APA, and can be implemented without unnecessary
uncertainty by a conscientious agency, assisted by judicial guidance. By
following this approach, the administrative agencies can publicly
promulgate the large proportion of bureaucratically created law that
takes the form of interpretative rules and general statements of policy
without greatly increasing the cost of government.

